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Sovereignty and cooperation in regional Pacific tuna
fisheries management: Politics, economics, conservation
and the vessel day scheme
Quentin Hanich,* Hannah Parris† and Martin Tsamenyi*

Abstract
The Pacific islands region has developed a collaborative approach to fisheries management that has set global
precedents in regional fisheries co-operation and significantly boosted Islanders’ capacity to manage the
region’s tuna fisheries in a manner consistent with their individual national interests. Through this cooperation,
the Pacific islands states have developed a collective influence in fisheries negotiations that is arguably far
greater and more effective than what they could achieve individually. During 2007-2009, the Pacific islands
region further developed its collective approach by establishing new initiatives in regional fisheries cooperation that are of global interest. Chief among these is the Vessel Day Scheme, which introduces a flexible
and potentially tradeable permit scheme into regional management, and a supporting set of zonal based
management measures. This paper examines the evolution and development of these recent management
initiatives and provides a tentative evaluation of these against the conservation and management agreements
entered into by the Pacific islands.
______________________________________________
Introduction
Regional co-operation is vitally important in the
Pacific islands region due to the migratory nature of
the region’s tuna stocks, and consequently the
fisheries themselves, and the limited capacity of
most Pacific island states 1 to take advantage of their
rights and discharge their obligations under the
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 2 (LOSC)
following the extension of maritime zones of
jurisdiction. The Pacific island states have
* Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and
Security, University of Wollongong.
†
Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian
National University. Ms Parris gratefully acknowledges the
financial support provided by the Australian Research
Council and the CSIRO Wealth from Oceans Flagship
Program in undertaking this research.
1
The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) is a
subsidiary body of the Pacific Islands Leaders Forum. It
promotes coordination and cooperation on fisheries issues,
particularly with respect to the region wide tuna fisheries.
Membership mirrors that of the Forum and includes
Australia, New Zealand, Cook Islands, Federated States of
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue,
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands,
Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. For the purposes of
this paper, the term ‘Pacific island states’ refers to FFA
members except Australia and New Zealand.
2
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for
signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into
force 16 November 1994).

developed a strong collective approach and recently
established new initiatives in regional fisheries cooperation that are of global interest. These regional
achievements are particularly impressive given the
limited goverance capacity of the region, and the
fragile economic situation in many of the Pacific
states. This paper examines the evolution and
development of these recent management initiatives,
with particular focus on the Vessel Day Scheme.
The Pacific island states and territories and their
tuna fisheries
The Pacific islands region encompasses a unique
grouping of small island states characterised by
small land masses surrounded by large oceanic
exclusive economic zones (EEZs). In total, these
zones cover approximately 30 569 000 km² of the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) 3 and
include some of its most productive fishing waters.
3

For the purposes of this paper, the WCPO is defined as those
waters within the Area defined by the Convention on the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. This
stretches from Indonesia and the Philippines in the west to
Hawaii, Kiribati and French Polynesia in the east. This region
is defined in Convention for the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean, opened for signature 5 September
2000 (entered into force 19 June 2004) art 1.
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The WCPO tuna fisheries (skipjack, yellowfin,
bigeye and albacore) were worth approximately
A$5.4 billion in 2008. 4 Roughly 57 per cent of all
WCPO catches are taken from the Pacific island
EEZs, the remainder from high seas and other
coastal states.

and are now considered to be domestically based
vessels. 6
These fisheries are coming under increasing
pressure from overfishing and overcapacity.
Scientific and economic advice has clearly stated
that overfishing and overcapacity now threaten the
long term sustainability of some key fish stocks 7
with fishing effort significantly above optimal
levels. This is reducing the profitability of the
fishery and undermining opportunities for Pacific
island states to develop fishing and related
industries. 8

These fisheries are a key development opportunity
for many of the region’s developing island states
and provide significant financial contributions to
governments. Many Pacific island States,
particularly in the western part of the region, depend
heavily upon these fisheries for revenue and
economic activity. 5

Regional institutions for fisheries cooperation
and capacity building

The two key fleets in the Pacific islands tuna
fisheries are distant water fishing vessels and
domestic fishing vessels. Distant water fishing
vessels provide the majority of the fleet and
originate predominately from China, Japan, Korea,
the United States, Taiwan and the European Union.
They are either based within a Pacific island state
(due to licensing requirements or operational
factors) or operate from a distant home port. They
catch the majority of the value in the fishery and
operate through access agreements or are directly
licensed by the coastal states to fish within their
EEZ.

The Pacific islands states depend heavily upon
regional cooperation and the effective operation of
regional institutions to enable and support fisheries
management and development. The success of this
cooperation is critically important given the highly
migratory nature of the region’s tuna fisheries and
the region’s limited national capacity and its high
dependence upon fisheries resources. Any serious
threat to the sustainability of the tuna resource can
be viewed as a threat to the region’s economic
viability and food security.
In 1979, the independent members of the Pacific
Islands Forum (then named the South Pacific
Forum) foresaw the challenges involved in
managing and developing their newly proclaimed
EEZs and recognised that individually they did not
have the capacity to respond adequately to these
challenges and maximise their opportunities. With
remarkable vision, they combined their resources
and established the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries
Agency (FFA) to promote intra-regional cooperation
and harmonisation of fisheries management policies.
The mission of the FFA is to support and enable
Pacific island states to achieve sustainable fisheries

Domestic fishing vessels are either nationally owned
and operated, or foreign owned and operated
through domestic charters and/or joint ventures with
local interests. They are generally smaller vessels
that mostly fish for tuna within their own flag state’s
EEZ. The majority of such vessels are longliners,
although in the past decade an increasing number of
purse seiners have registered in Pacific island states

4

5

Robert Gillett, ‘Pacific Islands Region’ in Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Review of
World Marine Fishery Resources No 457 (2005) 144; Peter
Williams and Peter Terawasi, ‘Overview of Tuna Fisheries in
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, including Economic
Conditions – 2008 WCPFC-SC5-2009/GN WP-1’ (Paper
presented at the Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission, Port Vila, Vanuatu 10-21 August 2009). For the
purposes of this estimate, this includes the EEZs of: (FFA
members) Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji,
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu,
Vanuatu (and non-FFA members) American Samoa, French
Polynesia, New Caledonia, Pitcairn Island, and the French
territory of Wallis and Futuna. The data for this estimate was
sourced from Gillett.
Asian Development Bank, The Pacific’s Tuna: The
Challenge of Investing in Growth (1997); Robert Gillett,
Mike McCoy, Len Rodwell and Josie Tamate, Tuna: A Key
Economic Resource in the Pacific Islands (2001).

6

7

8

2

Elizabeth Havice, ‘The State of Play of Access Agreements
with Distant Water Fishing Partners: Implications and
Options for Pacific Island Countries’, report to the Forum
Fisheries Agency (2007).
See, eg, Anonymous, ‘Report of the Scientific Committee,
fourth regular session’ (paper summarising the Fourth
Regular Session of the Scientific Committee, Port Moresby,
Papua New Guinea. 8-19 August 2008), available at Western
and
Central
Pacific
Fisheries
Commission
<http://wcpfc.org.int> at 17 January 2009.
Tom Kompas and Nhu Che, ‘Economic Profit and Optimal
Effort in the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries’
(2005) 21 Pacific Economic Bulletin 46; Michel Bertignac,
John Hampton and Anthony Hand, ‘Maximising Resource
Rent from the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries’
(2000) 15 Marine Resource Economics 15.
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and maximise their social and economic benefits in
harmony with the broader environment. 9

establishment of the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).

The FFA does not manage the tuna fisheries and has
no such mandate to do so. Neither does it have any
authority to enforce decisions of its governing
council. 10 This is an important feature of its
operation that ensures that each member maintains
full national decision making power over the
fisheries within its EEZ. This principle of national
implementation was central in the establishment of
the FFA, as its formation caused some concern
among DWFNs which interpreted the organisation
as a regional fisheries management organisation and
therefore should be open to the participation of
DWFN with an interest in the tuna fisheries. 11 Some
of these DWFN, particularly the United States of
America (US), did not recognise the sovereign rights
of coastal states over migratory fisheries, 12 or
recognise the fundamental capacity building purpose
of the FFA.

The FFA works closely with the Oceanic Fisheries
Programme (OFP) of its partner agency, the
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). 14 OFP
is one of a number of SPC programs that aim to
build capacity within the Pacific islands region and
support members with technical assistance. The
OFP provides fisheries science services to its
members (primarily relating to tuna) and is also a
contracted science provider for the Scientific
Committee of the WCPFC.

The FFA supports the interests of the Pacific island
states by facilitating regional cooperation and
providing technical and policy advice. Concerns
over the role of the FFA were effectively laid to rest
in the early 1990s when discussions began 13 for the

The first of these arrangements, and the key driving
force behind the later cooperative agreements, was
established in 1982 by a sub-set of the FFA
membership. The 1982 Nauru Agreement
Concerning Cooperation in the Management of
Fisheries of Common Interest (Nauru Agreement,
1982) 15 was negotiated by the equatorial Pacific

9

10

11

12

13

Cooperative approaches to fisheries management
and domestication
The FFA has been successful in its work to support
sub-regional and regional cooperation relating to
access by foreign fishing fleets into EEZs. In this
area, the FFA has facilitated the development of a
number of key regional arrangements.

Forum Fisheries Agency, FFA Strategic Plan 2005-2020
(2005).
Forum
Fisheries
Agency.
<http://www.
ffa.int/system/files/FFA_Strategic%20Plan.pdf>
at
23
November 2009.
Transform Aqorau, ‘Cooperative Management of Shared Fish
Stocks in the South Pacific’ (Paper presented to NorwayFAO expert consultation on the management of shared fish
stocks, Bergen, Norway, 7-10 October 2002).
John Van Dyke and Susan Heftel, ‘Tuna Management in the
Pacific: An Analysis of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries
Agency’ (1981) 3 University of Hawaii Law Review 1.
While some DWFNs (most notably the US) historically
rejected interpretations of LOSC that granted coastal states
sovereign rights over migratory species within their EEZs,
the reality at sea moved on. For over 20 years, the status quo
has reflected the coastal state interpretation and there is no
indication that fishing states are likely to fish for tuna within
EEZs without the permission of coastal states. It is now
widely accepted that LOSC grants coastal states ‘practically
exclusive powers over regulating access’ to the fisheries
within their EEZ, including straddling and highly migratory
fish stocks. See Erik Molenaar, ‘Participation, Allocation and
Unregulated Fishing: The Practice of Regional Fisheries
Management Organisations’ (2003) 22 International Journal
of Marine and Coastal Law 454.
For a history of the FFA’s role in the formation of the
WCPFC, see Sandra Tarte ‘A Duty to Cooperate: Building a
Regional Regime for the Conservation and Management of
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central
Pacific’ in (2002) Ocean Yearbook 261. The oganisational
structures of the FFA and the secretariat allowed the Pacific
island states to successfully act as a negotiating bloc against
the larger DWFNs and thereby ensure that the text of the
Convention was developed on terms favourable to them. See

14

15

3

Hannah Parris, Andrew Wright and Ian Cartwright, ‘The
Challenges of Fisheries Governance Post UNFSA: The case
of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission’ in
R Quentin Grafton, Ray Hilborn, Dale Squires, Meryl
Williams and Maree Tait (eds), Handbook of Marine
Fisheries Conservation and Management (2010).
Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Secretariat of the
Pacific
Community
Vision and
Mission (2005)
<http://www.spc.int/corp/index.php?option=com_conte
nt&task=view&id=22&Itemid=73> at 3 December 2008.
SPC was the first of the regional forums to be established. It
was founded in 1947 by the colonial powers of the time:
Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands, France, United
Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US). The
membership evolved through the period of de-colonisation
and now includes the independent Pacific island states (Cook
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati,
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea
(PNG), Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and
Vanuatu) the Pacific island territories (American Samoa,
French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Northern Mariana
Islands, Pitcairn Islands, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna) and
Australia, New Zealand, France and the US. The organisation
is headquartered in Noumea, with regional offices throughout
the Pacific islands region.
Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the
Management of Fisheries of Common Interest, opened for
signature 11 February 1982 (entered into force 4 December
1982)
(‘Nauru
Agreement’)
available
at
<http://www.ffa.int/node/93#attachments> at 10 March
2009. PNG, FSM, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau,
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island states – reflecting the relatively richer tuna
resources that are found within the EEZs of these
countries.

Pacific-US relations. The USMLT is a multilateral
treaty negotiated with all FFA members. It
comprehensively covers issues such as licence
numbers, access conditions, access fees and
reporting obligations. The treaty allows a US fleet of
distant water fishing vessels to roam freely between
the EEZs of FFA countries in return for access fees
and the establishment of a development assistance
fund.

The Pacific island Parties to the Nauru Agreement
(PNA) recognised that they were in a weak position
when negotiating access arrangements individually
with DWFNs, particularly when DWFNs actively
sought to manipulate each state against each other in
negotiations over access fees and conditions. 16 In
response, the states that would become the PNA
negotiated the Nauru Agreement in order to
coordinate
and
harmonise
their
fisheries
management and access conditions, thereby placing
themselves in a stronger strategic position when
negotiating with DWFNs. The Nauru Agreement
has the following objectives:
•

coordinate and harmonise management of
common fish stocks between PNA, without
derogating any of their sovereign rights (art 1);

•

give priority consideration for licensing PNA
vessels over foreign vessels (art 2a);

•

establish minimum terms and conditions for
foreign vessel access (art 2b); and

•

cooperate and coordinate fisheries monitoring,
control and surveillance (arts 6 and 7).

Cooperation further developed during the late 1980s
and early 1990s as Pacific island members of the
PNA became increasingly concerned at the rapid
expansion of the purse seine fishery and its potential
impact on the long term sustainability of the WCPO
tuna fisheries. In light of these concerns, PNA
initiated discussions in 1990 to develop
arrangements that might limit purse seine numbers
within the PNA sub-region. During these
discussions, the PNA agreed to introduce interim
limits on how many purse seine vessels they would
license to fish in their collective EEZs while
negotiating a more comprehensive arrangement to
limit purse seine fishing across all PNA EEZs. In
1990, PNA agreed to provisionally limit the number
of purse seine vessel licenses to 164 purse seine
vessels but by 1993, this limit had increased to its
final maximum of 205. 18 These increases were due
to pressure from DWFNs to license vessels and
problems faced by national and regional fisheries
management institutions in verifying exactly how
many purse seine vessels were actually licensed
across all PNA EEZs. 19

The Nauru Agreement became the cornerstone for
regional cooperation and enabled subsequent
cooperative agreements to develop increasingly
harmonised approaches to common fisheries that
would extend beyond the limited membership of the
PNA.

In 1993, the Pacific island members of the PNA
concluded negotiations and signed the legally
binding Palau Arrangement for the Management of
the Purse Seine Fishery in the Western and Central

Pacific island cooperation further developed in the
late 1980s in response to the growing conflict
between Pacific island states and the USA via the
latter’s refusal to recognise EEZ rights in the context
of highly migratory tuna stocks. Negotiations during
1987 between the Pacific island states and the US
culminated with the adoption of the Treaty on
Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain
Pacific Island States and the Government of the
United States of America (USMLT). 17 The USMLT
commenced operation in 1988 and has since been
renewed three times, becoming a major plank of

16

17

18

19

Solomon Islands were all original signatories. Tuvalu
subsequently became a party in 1991.
Michael Lodge, ‘Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access:
Responsible Fisheries Management Measures in the South
Pacific Region’ (1992) 16 Marine Policy 277.
Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain
Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States
of America, opened for signature 2 April 1987 (entered into
force 15 June 1988) reprinted in 26 ILM 1048.

4

Steve Dunn, Len Rodwell, Glen Joseph, ‘The Palau
Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific
Purse Seine Fishery – Management Scheme (Vessel Day
Scheme)’ (Paper presented at the Sharing the Fish
Conference, March 2006, Perth Western Australia), available
at <http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/events/ShareFish/papers/
pdf/papers/GlenJoseph.pdf> at 1 March 2010.
See Transform Aqorau and Anthony Bergin, ‘Ocean
Governance in the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery: The
Palau Arrangement’ (1997) 21 Marine Policy 173; Michael
Lodge, ‘The Development of the Palau Arrangement for the
Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery’
(1998) 22 Marine Policy 1; Transform Aqorau, ‘Recent
Developments in Pacific Tuna Fisheries: The Palau
Arrangement and the Vessel Day Scheme’ (2009) 24 The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 557. The
development of the Palau Arrangement caused much concern
among DWFN and raised significant opposition as they,
correctly, saw this as the beginning of a gradual re-balancing
of power of tuna resources between fishing and coastal states.
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Pacific 20 which subsequently entered into force in
1995. Prior to the establishment of the WCPFC, the
Palau Arrangement was the only mechanism
available to control purse seine fishing effort in the
WCPO.

restriction on the number of purse seine vessels able
to access the fishing grounds. The objective of this
approach was to restrict fishing activity, under each
national fishing management regime, and thereby
harvests of the key target species of skipjack tuna
and yellowfin tuna. This was intended to promote
the sustainability of the tuna resources and increase
the level of economic returns obtained by the PNA
and FFA states from their tuna resources. This is
reflected in the preamble of the Palau Arrangement
which states:

The Palau Arrangement aims to protect tuna stocks
from overfishing and improve the economic benefits
to Pacific island members of the PNA from access
fees and fisheries development. It does this
primarily by limiting the licenses available to fish
within the PNA EEZs (therefore limiting catches
and hopefully increasing prices) and enabling
further cooperation in management of the purse
seine fisheries between PNA. Given its exclusive
coastal state membership, the scope of the
Arrangement was effectively limited to EEZs.
However, the preamble to the arrangement also
contains statements that emphasise the special
interest that coastal states have in tuna in adjacent
high seas areas. 21

Recognising the responsibilities of coastal states and
fishing states to cooperate with each other in the
conservation and management of the living marine
resources…and mindful of the dependence of
countries of the South Pacific upon the rational
development and utilization of the living marine
resources and the continued abundance of these
resources. 23

Implementation of the agreement remained a
national responsibility and, if successful, would
ensure that harvests would be maintained at
‘sustainable’ levels, 24 the total supply of canning
tuna would be restricted on the world markets, and
consequently, the price of the tuna, and the value of
the fishery would increase. It was argued that this
would benefit Pacific island states through higher
access fee revenues collected through licensing
DWFN vessels and other vessels to operate in
EEZs. 25

Concurrent to these developments, FFA member
interests in developing their own fisheries grew
throughout the 1980s and 1990s and many Pacific
island states aspired to replace DWFN fleets with
locally based domestic fleets. In support of these
aspirations, PNA members established the FSM
Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access. 22 The
Arrangement further elaborated the Nauru
Agreement’s objectives of supporting local
development and promoting PNA vessels over
DWFN vessels. In this regard, the FSM
Arrangement provided for lower cost licenses and
access to the waters of all PNA states for domestic
and locally based vessels that met specific criteria.

The question of allocating vessel limits was resolved
through honouring the terms of the US Treaty
(which allowed for 40 vessels) and then allocating
most of the remaining vessels to existing DWFNs.
Additional allocations, with favourable terms of
access, were set aside for fishing for domestic
vessels under the FSM Arrangement. This was
intended to encourage domestication of purse seine
vessels and met with some moderate success. 26

Taken together, the essence of these arrangements is
a mutual agreement to coordinate national purse
seine management policies through a global

20

21

22

The Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Purse
Seine Fishery in the Western and Central Pacific, opened for
signature 19 September 1990 (entered into force 1 November
1995). <http://www.ffa.int/node/91#attachments> at 14
March 2010. Annex 1 was revised at the Thirteenth Annual
Meeting of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement, 27-29 April
1994.
For further discussion see, eg, Vina Ram-Bidesi, ‘Regional
Arrangements for Management and Development of Tuna in
the Pacific Islands: The Case Study of Palau Arrangement
and the Federates States of Micronesia Arrangement’ (Paper
for the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and
Trade Conference, Victoria University of Wellington, New
Zealand, 19-22 August 2002).
Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement, opened for
signature 30 November 1994 (entered into force 23
September 1995) (‘FSM Arrangement’) available at
<http://www.ffa.int/node/30#attachments> at 14 March 2010.

23
24

25

26

5

Palau Arrangement, above n 20. See also Aqorau, above n 19.
Les Clark, Ray Research. Interviewed by author in Honiara,
Solomon Islands, 7 April 2006.
Les Clark, Pacific 2020. Background Paper: Fisheries
(2006). In general, access fees were expressed as a
percentage of the value of the fish harvested within an EEZ,
with access fee negotiations focused on determining expected
levels of catch, expected prices and percentage rates (usually
around 5-6 per cent).
Hannah Parris, Kate Barclay and Ian Cartwright, Review of
the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement (2007).
First, it appears that the FSM arrangement has spurred some
PNA to invest in the harvesting sector. Second, it has
encouraged foreign direct investment into PNA to obtain
fishing licenses for all PNA waters. See Havice, above n 6.
However, for various reasons, the FSM Arrangements seems
to have had limited success in domesticating vessels from
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introduce an annual registration for the regional
vessel register. Once again, the broader membership
of the FFA endorsed the PNA’s expanded HMTCs
and agreed that the conditions should be
implemented throughout all FFA EEZs 31

Cooperative approaches to fisheries monitoring,
control and surveillance
Immediately after concluding the Nauru Agreement,
the Pacific island members of the PNA began
negotiating the first of three implementing
arrangements that would operationalise the treaty’s
objectives. 27 The First Implementing Arrangement
to the Nauru Agreement 28 was adopted in
September 1983 and established agreed Harmonised
Minimum Terms and Conditions for foreign fishing
vessels (HMTCs). While these conditions were
originally intended to apply only to PNA, the
broader FFA endorsed a draft of the conditions
during their negotiations and began a parallel
initiative that quickly extended the application of the
HMTCs to the entire FFA membership. The HMTCs
harmonised licensing procedures and catch reporting
and established a regional register of fishing vessels.
Each Pacific island state is responsible for the
implementation of these conditions at the national
level. 29

Regardless of these new agreements on harmonised
licensing conditions, Pacific island states still
suffered from a lack of capacity to patrol and
monitor their massive EEZs. In response, the Pacific
island members of the FFA adopted a treaty
framework in 1993 that enabled FFA member states
to cooperate in surveillance and enforcement and
share surveillance assets.
The Niue Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries
Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South
Pacific Region 32 is essentially an umbrella
arrangement that supports the development of
subsidiary agreements to implement surveillance
and enforcement cooperation at the bi-lateral or subregional level. Despite some initial interest, FFA
members were slow to finalise subsidiary
agreements due to the high costs involved in running
surveillance patrols. 33 However, while negotiation
of subsidiary agreements was slow, FFA members
began to cooperate more actively in joint
surveillance operations through Memorandum’s of
Understanding (MOU). 34

In April 1990, following a significant increase in the
number of vessels fishing in PNA waters and a
desire from some PNA to review the HMTCS, the
PNA commissioned a legal drafting group to
prepare a draft second implementing arrangement.
The Second Implementing Arrangement to the
Nauru Agreement 30 came into effect in January
1991 and expanded the HMTCs to incorporate
observer requirements, prohibit transhipments at
sea, expand monitoring and surveillance, and

27

28

29
30

Since 2000, FFA members have shown significantly
more interest in surveillance and enforcement
cooperation and have also expressed interest in
inviting non-FFA states, particularly France and the
US, to cooperate more actively with FFA members
in surveillance and enforcement activities. There are
now four subsidiary agreements in effect, 35 a further
six awaiting government endorsement, and an
increasing number of regular multilateral fisheries
surveillance operations that include Niue Treaty
members and non-members providing support (such

DWFN into becoming truly locally based (or domestic) in the
PNA. The Parris, Barclay and Cartwright review of the FSM
Arrangement in 2007 found that there was significant
variation in the amount and quality of benefits gained from
the FSM Arrangement to PNA and that other factors, not
related to the FSM Arrangement, were probably just as
important as the Arrangement in promoting domestication
and onshore development (i.e. proximity to fishing grounds,
availability of land, infrastructure and services and domestic
government policy).
For details of negotiations for the First and Second
Implementing Arrangement, see Lodge, above n 16; David
Doulman, ‘Fisheries Cooperation: The Case of the Nauru
Group’ in David Doulman (ed), Tuna Issues and Perspectives
in the Pacific Islands Region (1987).
First Implementing Arrangement (1983). Full title: An
Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting
Forth Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access to the
Fisheries Zones of the Parties. Copy available in Appendix 2
of Lodge, above n 16.
Aqorau, above n 10.
Second Implementing Arrangement (1991). A Second
Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting
Forth Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to the
Fisheries Zones of the Parties. Copy available in Appendix 2
of Lodge, above n 16.

31

32

33

34

35

6

Forum Communique of the Twenty-First South Pacific
Forum. Port Villa, Vanuatu 31 July-1 August 1990.
<www.forumsec.org/_resources/article/files/1990%20Comm
unique.pdf> at 19 March 2009.
The Niue Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries Surveillance
and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region. Reprinted
in Commonwealth Law Bulletin 702; (1993) 32 ILM (entered
into force 20 May 1993) (‘Nuie Treaty’).
Transform Aqorau, ‘Illegal Fishing and Fisheries Law
Enforcement in Small Island Developing States: The Pacific
Islands Experience’ (2000) 15 The International Journal of
Marine and Coastal Law 31.
Most notably, Palau, FSM and Marshall Islands (which
subsequently formalised the MOU into a subsidiary
agreement).
FSM, Palau and Marshall Islands; Australia and PNG; Tonga
and Tuvalu; Samoa and Cook Islands.
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as aerial surveillance). 36 FFA members are now
considering the development of a multilateral
subsidiary agreement and invoking Article XII(5) of
the Niue Treaty to enable US and France to
participate.

operatively and sustainably manage WCPO tuna
resources across their entire range. 37 This was
followed by six further conferences until
negotiations concluded in 2000 with the successful
adoption of the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries
Convention
(hereafter
WCPF
Convention) 38 which subsequently entered into
force in July 2004. The objective of the WCPF
Convention, as described in Article 2, is to ensure
the long term conservation and sustainable use of
WCPO straddling and highly migratory fish stocks
in accordance with LOSC and the Agreement
(UNFSA). The WCPF Convention establishes the
decision making Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), which meets
annually, and a secretariat which is headquartered in
FSM.

Similarly, during the late 1990s, the FFA discussed
establishing the world’s first centralised satellite
based vessel monitoring system (VMS). In 1997, the
entire FFA membership of Pacific island states
agreed to expand the HMTCs and require all their
licensed foreign vessels to report continuously to a
satellite based VMS that would be operated by the
FFA secretariat and would forward vessel positions
to national officers to monitor.
Cooperation between Pacific island states and
DWFN: The development of the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

The Pacific island states are a critical membership
bloc of the WCPFC and were a key driver behind its
development. Other WCPFC members include
(among others) Indonesia, the Philippines and the
existing DWFNs of Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan,
the US and the European Community. The WCPF
Convention binds these members to implement its
provisions and WCPFC conservation and
management measures. Since its establishment in
2004, the WCPFC has agreed on a number of
conservation measures that impose specific
obligations on all members.

The jurisdictional boundaries of the FFA Treaties
were limited both by the extent of EEZ rights, as set
out under LOSC, and by the spatial pattern of
fishing resources, which determined the influence
that the treaties exerted over the fleets. The reason
that these Treaties focused on purse seine rather than
long lining gears was due to the relative dominance
of fishing activity of the former gear type within
EEZs. Since the majority of longlining activity took
place on the high seas areas of the WCPO, the FFA
states had less power to control this activity and,
despite efforts, they were never able to replicate an
equivalent set of Treaties for this gear type.

The WCPFC closely follows the framework
established by the United Nations Fish Stocks
Agreement 39 and emphasises a precautionary and
ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management.
The WCPF Convention applies to all waters of the
WCPO, including both high seas and EEZs.
However, the WCPFC Convention states in Article 4
that nothing in the Convention shall prejudice the
rights, jurisdiction and duties of states under LOSC
and UNFSA, and that the WCPFC shall be
interpreted and applied in the context of, and in a
manner consistent with, LOSC and UNFSA. This is a
critical point for Pacific island states which saw this
clause as recognising and protecting their sovereign
rights over much of the fishery within their EEZs.

The limited coastal state membership of the FFA
and PNA inevitably limit their effectiveness because
these organisations did not include other key fishing
interests that also impacted upon the migratory tuna.
Until recently, fishing effort targeting the same
migratory stocks on the high seas and inside the
neighbouring waters of Indonesia and the
Philippines was essentially unregulated. In the early
1990s, FFA members recognised that a broader
regional forum was required to engage Pacific island
states with their DWFN partners, Indonesia and
Philippines and enable management of migratory
fisheries beyond their EEZs.
In 1994, the FFA hosted a multilateral high level
conference of Pacific island states and DWFNs on
the future management and conservation of
straddling and highly migratory fisheries within the
WCPO. This meeting agreed on the need to co36

37
38
39

Operations Bigeye and Island Chief in Micronesia,
Operations Kurukuru and Tui Moana in Polynesia, and
Operation Rai Balang between Palau and the Federated States
of Micronesia.

7

Tarte, above n 13.
WCPFC, above n 3.
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, opened for signature 4 August 1995 (entered into
force 11 December 2001) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.ht
m> at 5 April 2005.
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Commission’s functions. Resolving these conflicts
will be critical to the effective functioning of the
WCPFC and its ability to agree upon, and
implement effective conservation and management
measures across the range of the stocks. 43

A critical challenge for the WCPFC will be its
development of co-operative management across the
high seas/EEZ nexus, and directly or indirectly, the
allocation of rights to the tuna resource. There are
key disagreements between DWFN and Pacific
island states over how the Convention should be
interpreted
regarding
implementation
of
management measures in EEZs and on the issue of
allocation. 40 Both groups regularly cite articles of
the WCPF Convention and UNFSA in support of
their arguments.

The case for change from a Pacific island
perspective: The development of the Vessel Day
Scheme
What was the case for change?
While much has been achieved by the Pacific
islands region since the establishment of the FFA,
conservation issues have generally taken secondary
priority after development objectives. This was
reflected in both the structure and operation of the
FFA purse seine treaties and the decisions taken by
participating countries over time.

Pacific island states note that management measures
already exist within their EEZs and argue that the
main purpose for the WCPFC is to regulate the high
seas and ensure that stocks are not over-fished in
these areas. 41 This argument is supported by
provisions within both the WCPFC and the UNFSA
which require measures to be compatible across the
high seas and the relevant EEZs, taking into account
existing measures already in practice.

A key weakness of the Pacific island region’s
fishing vessel cap was that it did not account for
effort creep. 44 While the fishing vessel cap of 205
remained stable, it became increasingly apparent
that it was ineffective at promoting both
conservation and development interests. The vessel
cap made it difficult for new fleets to enter the
fishery that were more advantageous to PNA
interests. A more effective mechanism was required
that would enable better implementation of
conservation goals and support the short and long
term development interests of PNA members. 45 Key
problems included the following issues:

DWFNs argue that the WCPFC, as the primary
management authority for tuna across the region,
should establish management and conservation
measures across the entire range of the stocks, both
inside EEZs and on the high seas. 42 These states
refer to Article 10 of the WCPFC which provides
that the Commission can determine the quantity of
catches, levels of effort, limitations on fishing
capacity and other necessary management measures
throughout the convention area.
Pacific island states argue in return that the
Commission can establish ‘global’ catch, effort
and/or capacity limits across the entire Convention
area, but that it is the sovereign right of coastal
states to determine catches within their EEZs. This
is supported by the ‘without prejudice to the
sovereign rights of coastal States’ clause in Article
10 of the WCPF Convention regarding the
40

41

42

1. The vessl limit was too high and there was a
reluctance to adjust levels over time in light
of new information and opportunities as the
US fleet declined over time. In some years
the number of active vessels operating in the
region was below the notional 205 limit,
possibly indicating that this limit was higher
than what the fishery could profitability
support.
2. Deliberate encouragement by the parties to
the FSMA to increase vessels under the
FSMA. It is noted that since this data was

Parris et al, above n 13; Hannah Parris and Alex Lee,
‘Allocation Models in the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission and implications for Pacific Island
States’ in Quentin Hanich and Martin Tsamenyi (eds), Legal
and Policy Regimes in the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries (2009); Adam Langley, Andrew, Wright, Glenn
Hurry, John Hampton, Transform Aqorau and Len Rodwell,
‘Slow Steps Towards Management of the World’s Largest
Tuna Fishery’ (2009) 33 Marine Policy 271.
Vina Ram-Bidesi and Martin Tsamenyi, ‘Implications of the
Tuna Management Regime for Domestic Industry
Development in the Pacific SIDS States’ (2004) 28 Marine
Policy 383.
Laurence Cordonnery, ‘A Note on the 2000 Convention for
the Conservation and Management of Tuna in the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean’ (2002) 33 Ocean Development
and International Law 1.

43
44

45
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Parris et al, above n 13.
Effort creep can occur, for example, when fishing vessels
adopt better technology that allows them to catch ever more
fish. If effort is counted only in terms of number of vessels
the same amount of effort can catch more fish.
Len Rodwell, ‘FFA Initiatives related to the Palau
Arrangement, Purse Seine Management and the Management
of Bigeye Fishing Mortality in the WCPO WP FTWG-6’
(Paper presented to the 17th Meeting of the Standing
Committee on Tuna and Billfish SCTB17. Majuro, Marshall
Islands 8-18 August 2004).

Regional Pacific Tuna Fisheries Management

Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs (2010) Vol 2(1)

collected the US fleet increased in size,
although the exact extent is unknown.

value, for bilateral access). Within the VDS, the
total allowable effort (TAE) target would act as the
tool for determining ‘limits consistent with resource
sustainability’ while allocation between PNA states
was based on the unusual formula that combined
estimates of shares in biomass within PNA EEZs
with actual fishing history.

3. Reluctance by PNA members to adopt
further restrictions on the activities of
fishing fleets in order to account for effort
creep (e.g. restrictions in fish aggregation
device (FAD) use or vessel size).
Examination of data suggests that the
FSMA vessels, in particular, were the
source of most effort creep in terms of
increasing vessel size and increased use of
FADs. 46

The VDS enabled PNA to account for effort creep
by differentiating fishing days based on vessel
length and allowing for vessel formulas to be
modified over time to account for changes in
technology and efficiency. A key objective of the
VDS is to create competition between DWFN
vessels to purchase fishing days at the maximum
price. As the VDS has been introduced, allowances
have been made for vessels that fish under an
agreement between the USA and the Pacific island
states (the USMLT) and the FSM Arrangement
which was allocated a pooled effort target.

4. An implicit allocation of vessel access rights
to distant water fishing nations (DWFNs)
and
consequential
difficulties
in
accommodating new fleets who would pay
access fees on terms more favourable to the
PNA.
5. Insistence that access fees be negotiated
separately with DWFN. This resulted in a
continuing downward pressure on access fee
charges and a incentive to ensure that
domestic management regimes actively
encouraged vessels to enter their zones
(through generous in-kind assistance, and/or
by ensuring that domestic regulation did not
extend significantly beyond the regional
agreements).

There remains many similarities between the
original Palau Arrangement and the VDS – most
notably that individual PNA countries retain their
bilateral access arrangements while the FSMA and
the USMLT maintain their ‘bilateral’ character.
However, the VDS does introduce some innovations
include allowing days to be ‘traded’ between PNA
states, and a measure to manage capacity growth by
adjusting the value of a ‘fishing day’ according to
the size of the vessel. 48

The development of the Vessel Day Scheme

In 2008, the PNA adopted additional measures 49
which are designed to further curb purse seine effort
for those vessels operating within their waters.
These measures include:

In 2007, the PNA states agreed to convert the
structure of the Palau Arrangement from a vessel
based scheme to one where the total number of
fishing days permitted in the fishery were capped
within a Total Allowable Effort (TAE) designated in
‘fishing days’. Known as the ‘Vessel Day Scheme’
(VDS), 47 the objective was to re-allocate the quasiproperty rights away from the ‘right to operate a
vessel’, which primarily lay with the existing
DWFNs, to the PNA coastal states themselves. The
VDS became operational on 1 December 2007. It
would increase the bargaining power of PNA states
vis-à-vis bilateral access arrangements, as well as
allowing other interested DWFN fleets to participate
(and therefore expand the demand, and consequently
46

47

•

100 per cent observer coverage on purse seine
vessels operating in their EEZs;

•

a three month closure on FAD fishing in the
third quarter of the year; and

•

closure of high seas pockets. 50

48

Hannah Parris, Governing Complex Commons: Essays in
Regional Tuna Management in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean (Doctoral Thesis, The Australian National
University, 2009).
Forum Fisheries Agency, Information Sheet 07/01: Vessel
Day Scheme (VDS) Implementation (Parties to the Nauru
Agreement)
(2007)
available
at
<www.ffa.int/
system/files/VDS+information+Sheet+07_01.pdf>
at
4
March 2008.

49

50
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For those vessels with less that 50 metres, one ‘fishing day’
under the VDS is accounted for as half a day, for vessels with
length between 50-80 metres, one VDS ‘fishing day’ is
counted as one full day and for vessels with length over 80
metres, one VDS ‘fishing day’ is counted as one and a half
days. Previous rules relating to the negotiation and payment
of access fees, reporting obligations and rules relating to
operation of vessels within the fishery grounds remain as they
were under the previous Palau Arrangement.
A Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement
Setting Forth Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to
the Fisheries Zones of the Parties. Forum Fisheries Agency
(FFA). Honiara. Solomon Islands referred to as the ‘Third
Implementing Arrangement’.
See Forum Fisheries Agency, PNA Ministers Adopt Tough
Conservation and Management Measures to Address
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states can and (anecdotally) are increasing their
economic and political bargaining power with
respect to obtaining higher access fees, or other
benefits, from bilateral distant water fishing fleets.
Allocating resources in this way provides the
additional boost of allowing PNA countries to look
beyond traditional DWFNs partners and to broaden
the potential market for access rights to individual
EEZs. This, it is anticipated, will increase
competition (and hence benefits) for access to EEZ
fishing grounds.

These measures only apply to foreign vessels
operating in PNA waters. They do not apply to
domestic or domestically based vessels. They are
currently being implemented.
Operators of fishing vessels may voluntarily accept
or refuse this new licensing condition. Vessels may
continue fishing on the high seas if the operator
wants to, but in so doing they may not fish in PNA
EEZs. As such, the third implementing arrangement
does not breach the freedom of the seas that is
enshrined in Article 87 of LOSC. However, given
that the PNA EEZs contain the most productive
fishing grounds, the combination of the third
implementing arrangement and the VDS is a
powerful tool for managing fishing effort across the
entire high seas/EEZ fishing area. Despite
significant opposition from DWFNs, the PNA
signed the Third Implementing Arrangement 51 in
Palau in May 2008.

The income boosting potential of the VDS is
reinforced by provisions that allow PNA countries
to purchase ‘Days’ from each other. This has the
potential of creating additional revenue streams to
smaller Parties, which traditionally do not attract
purse seine effort in their EEZ (such as Palau and
Tuvalu).
At this early stage of implementation, evidence for
the success of the VDS is not yet conclusive,
although it appears that progress is being made in
several areas. First, it appears that business entities
from DWFNs (predominately the Philippines,
Taiwan, and to some extent Japan and China) are
actively investing in ‘on-shore’ developments in
PNA countries. This is most notable in PNG and to
some extent Solomon Islands and the Marshall
Islands. Operating a canning related facility is more
expensive and difficult than operating from the
home country, but the pace of investment appears to
be growing, fuelled by a general view in the industry
that without such business relationships, foreign
industry will, in future, be ‘cut out’ of the Pacific.

Benefits of the Vessel Day Scheme
The development of the VDS arose from the
growing dissatisfaction over the conservation
outcomes of the Palau Arrangement, and a sense
that sufficient economic opportunities were not
forthcoming from bilateral partners, or from vessels
under the FSM Arrangement. Like the original Palau
Arrangement, the full implications of the VDS will
only become apparent over time. In the interim, the
structure of the arrangement, and the manner in
which it is currently being implemented, allows for
some preliminary comments on its effectiveness at
addressing the perceived shortcomings of its
predecessor, and its support for conservation and
political objectives of the region.

Secondly, in matters of politics and influence, the
VDS appears to have significantly boosted the
collective capacity of Pacific island states to resist
DWFN pressure. For example, in 2006 and 2008,
key arguments between coastal states and DWFNs
were partly resolved in practice (although not agreed
in principle) through the incorporation of the PNA
VDS and the PNA Third Implementing
Arrangement into WCPFC conservation and
management measures. These decisions indirectly
endorsed the coastal state view of compatibility and
reinforced the rights of coastal states over
management of highly migratory fisheries within
their EEZs. The decisions made conservation and
management for high seas fisheries compatible with
existing management practised in EEZs. A key
example of this was the endorsement of the PNA
Third Implementing Arrangement’s closure of the
high seas pockets and its inclusion within the
WCPFC bigeye and yellowfin conservation and

Political and economic outcomes
The VDS seeks to advance the political and
economic postion of the PNA, and the FFA more
broadly, in a number of areas. The masterstroke of
the VDS was the reallocation of the implicit
property rights over the purse seine fishery away
from existing DWFNs (Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan
and others) to an explicit allocation of purse seine
effort to coastal states in line with their rights and
responsibilities under LOSC. In this way, PNA

51

Overfishing (Press Release Circ08039). For a more in-depth
discussion of these measures, see Transform Aqorau, above
n 19.
A Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement
Setting Forth Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to
the Fisheries Zones of the Parties. Forum Fisheries Agency
(FFA). Honiara. Solomon Islands referred to as the ‘Third
Implementing Arrangement’.
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management measure. 52 It is highly unlikely that the
WCPFC would have agreed to close any high seas
areas without the PNA Third Implementing
Arrangement decision to link high seas fishing to
access to the PNA EEZs.

interests of other states. 55 This issue remains
unresolved.
Conservation outcomes
From a conservation perspective, the VDS
introduces two important innovations into the Palau
Arrangement. First, unlike the Palau Arrangement,
the VDS is explicitly linked to a conservation and
management objective of restraining effort to 2004
effort levels. These effort levels are consistent with
broader regional developments in conservation
management, primarily through the the WCPFC.
These effort levels therefore address a weakness of
the original Palau Arrangement 56 which set arbitrary
vessel limits, based on the ‘status quo’, rather than
explicitly determining ‘optimal’ levels.

However, while there was progress on the issue of
EEZ/high seas compatibility, coastal state/DWFN
tensions arose in regard to the application of the
WCPFC to the archipelagic waters of coastal states.
Specifically, many coastal states, in particular PNG,
argued strongly that the terms of LOSC, UNFSA
and the WCPFC Convention itself, limited the
jurisdiction of the Commission to high seas areas
and EEZs. Their position was that internal and
archipelagic waters are to be managed at the
discretion of the coastal state. By contrast, the USA
argued against such an interpretation and stated its
position that the WCPFC applies to archipelagic
waters, as well as EEZs and high seas. 53

However, key challenges remain within the design
and implementation aspects of the VDS with respect
to conservation. In advice provided by the
Commission’s scientific advisors, the Commission
was warned was that effort levels should not
increase above 2004 levels. 57 Rather than follow this
exactly, the Commission adopted the politically
expedient interpretation of allowing participating
states, including the PNA, to select either a baseline
equivalent to effort levels expended in each zone in
2004 or an average of effort expended in each zone
over the period 2001-2004. At the time, this
approach was largely unproblematic due to the

Due to some controversy over the issue, the Chair of
the WCPFC requested an opinion from the legal
counsel on, among other things, the application of
the WCPFC to archipelagic seas. The legal counsel
referred to the WCPF Convention, LOSC and
UNFSA and suggested that the WCPF Convention
only has application to the high seas EEZs, and not
the internal waters, archipelagic waters and
territorial seas, due to qualifications in UNFSA and
the Convention between ‘sovereign rights’ and
‘sovereignty’. 54 Nevertheless, the legal counsel
noted that in addition to the WCPF Convention, the
LOSC and UNFSA, other principles of international
law need to be considered, particularly the principle
of ‘good neighbourliness’ which requires that states
must act in good faith and ensure that activities in
their territories do not cause harm or affect the

55

56

57

52

53

54

See WCPFC, ‘Conservation and Management Measure 200801’ (CCM 2008-01) a copy can be found at Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission website: Conservation
and Management Measures and Resolutions Updated on 5
March 2008, available at <http://www.wcpfc.int> at 30 May
2008.
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission ‘Fifth
Regular Meeting: Final Report summarising outcomes of the
Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean’, Busan, Korea, 8-12 December 2008.
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, ‘Fifth
Regular Meeting: Draft Report’ (Draft for Circulation) of a
Paper summarising outcomes of the Commission for the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Fifth
Regular Meeting, Busan, Korea, 8-12 December 2008.
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This principle is perhaps most clearly articulated in Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration. See Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.
Stockholm, Sweden, 5 to 16 June 1972, available at
<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?
DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503> at 14 March 2010.
Transform Aqorau, ‘The Federated States of Micronesia
Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access’ (1997) 12
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law; Lodge,
above n 16.
John Hampton, Pierre Kleiber, Adam Langley, Y Takeuchi
and Ichinokawa, ‘Stock Assessment of Yellowfin tuna in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean WCPFC-SC1’ (Paper
presented at the Scientific Committee First Regular Session
Noumea, New Caledonia, 8-19 August 2005); John Hampton,
Pierre Kleiber, Adam Langley, Y Takeuchi and Ichinokawa,
‘Stock Assessment of Bigeye tuna in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean WCPFC-SC1’ (Paper presented at the
Scientific Committee First Regular Session Noumea, New
Caledonia, 8-19 August 2005); Adam Langley, John
Hampton and M Ogura, ‘Stock Assessment of Skipjack tuna
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean’ (Paper presented at
the Scientific Committee First Regular Session Noumea, New
Caledonia, 8-19 August 2005); Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission, ‘Second Regular Meeting: Final
Report’ (Paper summarising outcomes of the Commission for
the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Second
Regular Meeting, Pohnpei, FSM, 12-16 December 2005).
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uncertainty associated with the advice and the
necessity of reaching an agreement. However,
during the ‘implementation’ phase of the VDS (from
its formal adoption by the WCPFC 58 in 2005 and
implementation on 1 December 2007) it has become
increasingly apparent that effort creep has continued
to undermine the conservation objectives of the
scheme.

particularly the case for addressing bigeye
conservation needs where the PNA states, the
primary beneficiaries of the purse seine fishery, are
being required to limit the benefits they derive from
the fishery for the preservation of benefits accruing
to other, non-PNA, longline states. To further
complicate matters, bigeye tuna, while not being a
primary target for them does nevertheless represent
a valuable addition to their small domestic long line
fisheries and is an important resource for other FFA
states.

In general, the effort levels, as defined by CMM
2005-01, 59 have since continued to increase above
the recommended effort levels proposed by the
scientific advisors. The final VDS allocation is now
approximately 12 per cent above 2004 levels.
Furthermore, the increase in fishing effort is
unevenly spread with PNG, Kiribati and the
USMLT, accounting for the majority of the change.

The PNA have correctly recognised that addressing
this issue requires broader cooperation with the
WCPFC and the Third Implementing Arrangement
can be interpreted as one response to this situation.
Despite these efforts, there remains the ongoing
challenge that the VDS is poorly designed to address
bigeye conservation. This is because it is focused on
limiting the effort of purse seine gear, which, in
turn, is an imprecise mode of control over the matter
of concern: bigeye tuna catches.

The issue of the absolute TAE has been further
complicated by the issue of ‘shifting’ baselines. For
instance it is notable that the 2004 effort level was
higher than the original baseline agreed to by the
PNA states which initially set the TAE at the
average purse seine effort expended in 2000-2002. 60
Although this could be justified on (biological)
sustainability grounds, as discussed above, it
nevertheless increases the number of purse seine
effort days by approximately 30 per cent. 61
Additionally, as with the WCPFC, the VDS does not
apply to archipelagic waters. This is particularly
significant in PNG’s archipelagic waters with their
high purse seine and FAD activity. Managing purse
seine effort within archipelagic waters remains
entirely outside any current cooperative frameworks
and is entirely at the discretion of the archipelagic
coastal state.

Its use in this manner is inefficient in the sense that
catches of valuable skipjack tuna ,that are not under
biological threat, are unnecessarily affected. For the
PNA states, this situation is arguably unfair because
they are bearing a disproportionate amount of costs
compared with the benefits they gain from bigeye
conservation. This view underpins the PNA’s
demand for compensation on this issue. It is clear
that resolution of this dilemma will require further
adjustments to the operation of the VDS. One
option, as discussed by Parris, 63 is to extend
property rights, at least over bigeye tuna, as a
mechanism for shifting the costs of bigeye
conservation towards those who may benefit from
them.

One of the key barriers to the adoption of tighter
conservation targets is the disjunction between those
who are deemed ‘responsible’ for conservation
measures in the WCPFC and those who may enjoy
the conservation benefits in the future. 62 This is

58

59
60
61

62

Capacity management in the VDS
The potential for substitution effects within the
purse seine fleets, leading to effort creep within
participating fleets, is receiving more attention
within the VDS framework. This is through
measures that adjust the number of available days
according to vessel size, and the Third
Implementing Arrangement which further restricts
vessel activities for distant water fishing fleets.
However, if the objective of VDS is to promote
‘optimal’ capacity for conservation purposes, it
remains the case that several aspects of the VDS, in

This was agreed to under Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission 'Conservation And Management
Measures For Bigeye And Yellowfin Tuna In The Western
And Central Pacific Ocean CMM 2005-01' (Adopted at
Second Regular Session, 12-16 December 2005, Pohnpei,
Federated States of Micronesia)
Ibid.
Rodwell, above n 45.
Rodwell, above n 45, reports that the original TAE for the
first three years of operation (i.e. ‘Management Period’) is set
at 27 386 days, while the PNA recently announced that the
actual days allocated was 35 738 days (an increase of 30.49
per cent).
For a fuller discussion see Hannah Parris, ‘Is the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Meeting its

63

12

Conservation and Management Objectives?’ (2009) 53 Ocean
and Coastal Management 10.
Parris, above n 46.
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particular its integration with the USMLT and
FSMA Treaties, potentially remain problematic.

amount, and therefore risk generating gradual
capacity creep over time. While the monitoring,
compliance and surveillance frameworks described
above represent an impressive regional infrastructure, their success depends on a strong
enforcement capacity at the national level which
unfortunately has been an area experiencing
significant problems in some PNA states. 66

The primary problem is that the VDS, largely for
historical reasons, has created an actual or proxy
‘Olympic style’ 64 fishery for vessels operating under
the FSMA and the USMLT Treaties. This is
achieved by the imposition of an actual global limit
on days available to the FSMA vessels and a
notional global limit applied to the USMLT vessels.
These limits are applied specifically to the domestic
Pacific and the US purse seine fleets operating
within the WCPO and in effect constitute a
circumscribed set of quasi-exemptions to the
broader WCPFC management measures for purse
seine vessels which are continually striving to
restrict and reduce total effort.

Another potential source of capacity slippage is the
ability to bring days forward from future year
allocation. In theory, ‘borrowing’ days from the
future should not be a significant problem provided
that the total number borrowed is not large.
However, to avoid significant capacity over run in
following years, this strategy requires significant
political and economic discipline within national
fisheries administrations in the face of intense
DWFN (and possibly domestic) pressure to increase
fishing, particularly on the abundant skipjack tuna
stocks.

This policy environment provides a strong incentive
for vessels owners who are eligible to operate under
these treaties to increase their per vessel capacity
and, where possible, to increase vessel numbers as
well. For example, the current USMLT restricts the
number of USA vessels that can be licensed under
the USMLT to 45 vessels. However, at the turn of
the century the number of vessels licensed under the
treaty declined to a low of 11 due to economic
factors. Since then, vessel numbers have
dramatically increased for two reasons. First, the US
removed its restriction on vessel origin and now
allows foreign built (and significantly cheaper)
vessels to be licensed under the treaty. Second, the
imminent implementation of fishing limits by the
equatorial Pacific island states created an incentive
for vessels to come under the USMLT umbrella to
avoid restrictions on fishing effort applied to other
DWFN vessels. 65

Conclusion
The key objective for the Pacific islands states is to
‘maximise the economic returns’ through a variety
of strategies to ensure that tuna stocks are managed
on a sustainable basis in order to underpin future
economic opportunities associated with the
resource. 67 Taken together, a key achievement of the
FFA Treaties was that they provided the FFA states,
and the PNA states in particular, with a politically
strategic, as well as a practical platform, from which
to pursue these economic and political interests with
respect to the tuna resources.
The advantages of the regional agreements occurred
simultaneously through several mechanisms. First,
the concurrent development of a regional
cooperative MCS regime with operations
coordinated by the FFA Secretariat was a critical
enabling tool for states unable to afford their own
comprehensive MCS regime. These MCS Treaties
provided members with vital facilities such as
observers, vessel monitoring services, agreement
and enforcement on the ban of at-sea trans-

There is also the potential for other sources of
capacity slippage to become problematic over time.
The first of these relates to the technical
infrastructure underpinning the VDS and the
interplay with the monitoring, control and
surveillance systems. Critical to the success of the
VDS is a functional and reliable Vessel Monitoring
System that is underpinned by rigorous enforcement
mechanisms. Without these two complementary
strategies, it is possible that the number of days
actually fished by vessels will exceed their allocated
64
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shipment, register of vessels and critical data to
support enforcement should states wish to do so.
These activities provided a dual service to the FFA
members: they provided data for the purposes of
stock management, but, more critically, provided the
information sources needed to underpin negotiations
for access agreements and consequently for
determining licence fees payable to the FFA
member governments. As a consequence, a major
achievement of the Palau Arrangement, and the FFA
more broadly, was to put in place the legal,
institutional and technical infrastructure to enable
states to assert, defend and enjoy the benefits from
the EEZ rights granted to them under the LOSC.

measure, further demonstrate the strength of the
FFA and PNA sub-group when they negotiate
collectively. Similiarly, the achievements of the
FFA and PNA management, control and
development mechanisms demonstrate the potential
of this sub-regional grouping to manage fishing
efforts throughout its area in the direct interests of
its members, and to extend its influence beyond its
immediate boundaries. While neither the current
VDS nor WCPFC conservation and management
measures yet meet conservation requirements as
recommended by SPC and the WCPFC Scientific
Committee, they provide the initial framework due
almost entirely to the drive of the FFA and PNA.

The second strategic advantage afforded by the PNA
treaties centred around the gradual development of
the PNA states around a unified regional process
based on perceived common interests in the purse
seine fishery. Based around the common modus
operandi of collective management (regular
meetings, building of interpersonal relationships,
development of common positions on issues and
joint decision making) the PNA group, in effect,
established a recognisable identity within regional
tuna politics. The value of this was underscored with
the advent of the WCPFC. Strong cooperative
mechanisms between the FFA states, particularly the
PNA states, became a key strategic advantage in
negotiations with other WCPFC parties over a wide
range of issues pertaining to the development of the
WCPFC as well as to matters of policy itself. This
was exemplified in the adoption by the WCPFC of
the VDS as an official management measure.

Fisheries policy development in the Pacific has
historically been an iterative process, with new
developments arising from and building upon
existing efforts. The VDS now reflects more closely
the Pacific island aspirations to take a proactive
approach to develop their own fisheries and progress
their own aspirations. Importantly, the VDS has
been developed and adapted to operate within the
available governance capacities of the region. This
is an important issue in the Pacific islands where
governance resources are highly limited. 69
The key success of the VDS is the strength of its
framework design. Yet achieving its potential
depends on the resolution of remaining design
issues, primarily the remaining olympic nature of
the fishery (that creates significant upwards pressure
on effort) and successfully finding ways to resolve
the bigeye tuna problem. It will also need to
overcome the key challenges with implementation:
baseline creep, and MCS. As pressures grow, and
global fishing fleets become more aggressive in
their hunt for open fishing grounds, resolving these
challenges and building strong cooperative
institutions will become increasingly critical to the
effective management, development and control of
the Pacific island tuna fisheries.

A less obvious, but equally powerful strategic
advantage of the purse seine treaties was the subtle
and gradual influence that they had in re-drawing
the power relationship between the PNA group, as
coastal states, and the major DWFNs. The PNA
treaties, in particular the FSMA, were in part an
expression of what Schurman 68 calls ‘resource
nationalism’ that arose during the 1990s. By
encoding and enforcing these nationalistic ideals
into international treaty, the DWFNs were forced,
over time, to recognise the legitimacy of these views
and shift their perspective of FFA states from being
merely ‘sellers’ of a low value natural resource to
being ‘partners’ in the future development of the
industry.
The recent achievements within the WCPFC,
particularly the bigeye and yellowfin conservation
68
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